IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 35919

| STATE OF IDAHO, |) 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 638 |
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| Plaintiff-Respondent, |) Filed: October 14, 2009 |
| v. | Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk |
| JOHN E. THURSTON, Defendant-Appellant. |) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED |
| | OPINION AND SHALL NOTBE CITED AS AUTHORITY |
| |) |

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified eight-year sentence, with three-year determinate term, for delivery of a controlled substance, <u>affirmed</u>.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before LANSING, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

John E. Thurston pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The district court imposed a unified ten-year sentence, with a four-year determinate term, but suspended the sentence and placed Thurston on probation. Subsequently, Thurston admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation. However, the district court reduced Thurston's sentence to a unified term of eight years, with a minimum period of confinement of three years. Thurston appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and that the modified sentence is excessive.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we do not base our review solely upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed. *State v. Whittle*, 145 Idaho 49, 52, 175 P.3d 211, 214 (Ct. App. 2007). Rather we also examine all the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation of probation. *Id*.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Thurston's modified sentence. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Thurston's sentence is affirmed.